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Abstract
The main objective ofrisk adjustment in systems ofregulated compe-
tition on healthinsurance markets is the removal ofincentives for undesir-
able risk selection.W e introduce a simple conceptual framework to clarify
how the definition of"acceptable costs"and the distinction between legit-
imate and illegitimate risk adjusters imply di!cult ethical trade-os be-
tween equity, avoidance ofundesirable risk selection and cost-eectiveness.
Focusingon the situation in Belgium, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands
and Switzerland, we show how dierences in the importance attached to
solidarity and in the beliefs about market e!ciency, have led to dierent
decisions with respect to the definition ofthe basic benefits package, the
choice ofrisk-adjusters, the possibilities ofmanaged care, the degree of
consumer choice and the relative importance ofincome-related financing
sources in the overall system.
1 Introduction
In many countries withvery dierent health care systems there is a trend to-
wards prospective and risk adjusted capitation financing.In public sector sys-
tems like the UK, the purpose ofthese capitations is usually phrased in equity
terms such as "to secure equal opportunity ofaccess to those at equal risk".1
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On the contrary, it is often claimed that in systems with competitive insurance
plans risk adjustment is mainly a technical device to improve the working of
insurance markets with community-rated premiums2 . As a matter of fact, this
is sometimes even the position of policy makers in the countries involved. This
paper argues that this perspective is highly misleading and that it hides the
ethical trade-os which are implicit in the determination of the capitations or
premium subsidies (which is the preferred terminology in competitive systems).
The whole idea of risk adjustment (and of managed competition for that matter)
is to create incentives for e!ciency while removing the incentives for undesirable
riskselection.This latter objective is very closely related to the ideal of equality
of access and/or equality of treatment. Moreover, broader issues of equity in
financing cannot be avoided when devising the risk adjustment system. We will
illustrate this point with concrete examples from five countries that have intro-
duced risk adjustment in a system with competing health insurers: Belgium,
Germany, Israel, the Netherlands and Switzerland.
Although in practice premium subsidies for dierent groups of the popula-
tion are derived from observed expenditures of these groups, it is obvious that
it would not make sense to simply equate "normative" with "actual" expendi-
tures. In order to undertake benchmarking one necessarily has to introduce a
notion of socially "acceptable" costs. This boils down to choosing in one way
or another a normative concept of "need". In this paper we will not elaborate
the philosophical discussion on needs, but rather present a general conceptual
framework to show how the notion of acceptable costs is related to crucial de-
sign features of the health insurance system. It will become clear that dierent
choices made in dierent countries reflect dierent implicit value judgments of
the decision makers (and possibly the population). Nor do we want to analyze
the pros and cons of all these dierent design features of a system of managed
competition. We directly focus on the consequences of these features for the
specific topic of risk adjustment.
In section 2 we first give a concise description of the risk adjustment mecha-
nism in the five countries considered. Next we will present a simple conceptual
framework to show in a structured way how equity considerations enter the de-
sign of a system of managed competition and why the notion of acceptable costs
plays a crucial role in this regard. The following sections apply these ideas to
four specific topics: the definition of the basic benefits package (section 4), the
choice of the variables to be included in the risk adjustment formula (section 5),
the scope for managed care and the treatment of voluntary deductibles (section
6), and finally the determination of the overall budget (section 7). Section 8
concludes.
2To quote Rice and Smith (2001a, p. 88): "...the immediate reason for concern (...) in
such systems (= with competitive insurance markets) is to help the insurance market function
properly, rather than to treat citizens equitably". Or: "The adjustments brought about
by capitation facilitate the operation of this market mechanism, which otherwise would be
rendered opaque by the variations in risk profiles and revenue bases of the competing plans"
(p. 90).
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2 Risk adjustment and ethical trade-os: the
policy setting
In the five countries considered (Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Israel and
Switzerland) risk adjustment was introduced in the first half of the nineties, but
the rationale for introducing it was quite dierent. To understand the choices
made, some insight in this background is necessary3 . Belgium and the Nether-
lands are similar in that before the introduction of risk adjustment, sickness
funds had no financial responsibility and there was no problem of risk selection.
In the Netherlands one of the explicit aims of changing the system was to foster
competition and to stimulate sickness funds to become consumer-oriented pur-
chasers of care. This was not the case in Belgium, where risk adjustment was
introduced only to bring about more distributional fairness towards the sickness
funds. They did not receive any additional policy instruments to control costs,
however, and it was certainly not the aim of the regulator to introduce more
competition. In the three other countries, sickness funds were already financially
responsible before the nineties. Risk adjustment was therefore introduced to re-
duce the consequences of risk selection. However, here the policy background
was also very dierent. In Germany, the health insurance system was rooted in
a social insurance system of the Bismarckian type;increasing consumer choice
was expected to lead to better quality and to a more e!cient cost containment
by the sickness funds. Similar considerations played an important role in Israel.
However, contrary to the German situation, Israeli sickness funds had a history
of managed care. In Switzerland, there has always been a strong reliance on
private health insurers. The idea of the regulator was that increasing consumer
mobility would lead to convergence of the risk portfolio of the sickness funds,
so that in a certain sense a better working of the market would make risk ad-
justment superfluous. We will show that this latter expectation does not make
much economic sense.
For a good understanding of the country-specific discussions on risk adjust-
ment, a better knowledge of specific institutional details is necessary. However,
for our broad country comparison, it is su!cient to structure the dierences
along three dimensions. First, the historical emphasis on solidarity has been
the strongest in Belgium and in the Netherlands and the weakest in Switzerland
and Israel. Second, the belief in managed care has always been strong in Israel,
is important in the Netherlands and Switzerland, much weaker in Germany and
non-existent in Belgium. Third, the belief in the working of the market mecha-
nism is strongest in Switzerland and the Netherlands, and by far the weakest in
Belgium. It will turn out that these institutional and historical dierences have
a crucial impact on the ethical choices made in the context of risk adjustment.
Before we turn to these it is useful to go somewhat deeper into the organization
of the system of managed competition in a mandatory health insurance market.
As described in Van de Ven and Ellis (2000) and Van de Ven et al. (2003)
3More details can be found in van de Ven et al. (2003). See also the country papers in the
same issue of Health Policy.
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Figure 1: External subsidy system
PCi
                           SCi
InsurerInsured
Central fund
     Ȧi
there are basically two modalities for organizing a risk adjustment system. The
first (external) subsidy system has been set up in the Netherlands, Belgium and
Israel, the second (internal) subsidy system in Germany and Switzerland.
2.1 The external subsidy system (the Netherlands, Bel-
gium, Israel)
The external subsidy system is illustrated in Figure 1. In this system the pre-
mium Sl paid by consumer i consists of two parts: a premium contribution SF l
paid to her (freely chosen) sickness fund and a (possibly income-related) soli-
darity contribution VFl going directly to a solidarity fund. The direct payment
of solidarity contributions VFl to the central fund makes it possible to incor-
porate any ideal of equity in finance into the system. More specifically, in all
three countries these solidarity contributions are income related. We will denote
the total amount of solidarity contributions by $ =
P
l VFl. If we denote the
reimbursable expenditures of consumer i by Fl, the overall budget constraint
of the system can be written as
X
l
SF l + $ =
X
l
Fl (1)
The sum of the solidarity contributions $ is distributed over the sickness
funds: for each individual member i they receive a premium subsidy $l. For
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equity reasons, in all three countries the freedom of the sickness funds to set the
premiums SF has been restricted. In the Netherlands and Belgium community
rating per sickness fund is imposed. In Israel, the regulator even requires that
premium contributions have to be equal to zero. Since the reimbursable expen-
ditures of dierent members will be dierent, an undierentiated distribution of
$ would therefore result in incentives for risk selection and cream-skimming: the
sickness funds would be able to make profits from individuals with low medical
expenditures and would incur losses on individuals with high medical expendi-
tures. They would therefore try to attract the former and to deter the latter.
The whole idea of risk adjustment now consists of defining the premium subsi-
dies $l in such a way that these incentives for risk selection disappear. Premium
subsidies will therefore be linked to the risk profile of the members of a sickness
fund. However, since in principle they are not related to actual expenditures,
sickness funds retain all incentives to control costs. We will explore these issues
in greater depth in section 3.
2.2 The internal subsidy system (Germany, Switzerland)
Figure 2 illustrates the main features of the second modality of risk adjustment,
i.e. the internal subsidy system as introduced in Germany and Switzerland. In
this system each consumer i pays the complete premium SF l to her sickness
fund. Since there is no explicit (income-related) solidarity contribution going di-
rectly to a central fund, it is less straightforward to implement a specific concept
of equity in finance. Risk solidarity is again pursued by imposing restrictions on
the premium-setting behavior of the sickness funds. As in the external subsidy
system, imposing community rating creates obvious incentives for risk selection.
As Figure 2 shows, however, in order to minimize these incentives an internal
subsidy system can be set up, in which the sickness funds pay into or receive
from a solidarity fund an amount $l per member. Of course, since in this case
$ = 0, the budget constraint for the solidarity fund boils down to
X
l
SF l =
X
l
Fl= (2)
The fact that $ = 0 does increase the relative importance of the direct premium
contributions SF in the overall financing of the system, but it does not change
the basic rationale of risk adjustment.
Switzerland imposes community rating per sickness fund (dierentiated by
region), but the government gives direct subsidies to the poor. From the point
of view of insurance these subsidies do not complicate the system of Figure 2. In
Germany, premium contributions are proportional to incomes with the propor-
tionality rate identical for all members of a sickness fund. One could interpret
this as a situation in which SF l in Figure 2 is the sum of a (flat) premium con-
tribution and a kind of income-related solidarity contribution. Contrary to the
situation in Figure 1, these solidarity contributions go directly to the sickness
funds, however, and therefore sickness funds with richer members have more
financial power. The German risk adjustment system compensates for these
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Figure 2: Internal subsidy system
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dierences in financial power. It is as if the sickness funds pay VFl to the risk
adjustment fund and get $l in return (see Buchner and Wasem, 2003). This
complicates the mechanism considerably and raises some additional questions
concerning equity in finance. We will return to these issues in section 7. To make
the discussion more transparent, we neglect these complications until then and
assume that there is community rating per sickness fund.
2.3 Policy choices
It should be evident that the choice between an external and an internal subsidy
system already reflects the dierences in institutional background sketched be-
fore. It is no coincidence that the countries with strong financial responsibility
for the sickness funds before the nineties have opted for the internal system.
However, from a purely theoretical point of view, both systems lead to equiva-
lent results. Within each system, similar questions have to be answered. Where
to draw the boundaries of the "subsidy system", i.e. what should be included
in the basic benefits package covered by the mandatory health insurance system
and what should be left to the free working of private markets?How to specify
the risk adjustment rule, i.e. how to distribute $ over the sickness funds? Is it
advisable to give the sickness funds some freedom in defining the basic benefits
package and, if so, how to take this into account in risk adjustment? What
instruments for control of expenditures should be given to the sickness funds?
And if dierent policies lead to dierences in the level of expenditures, how
should these be taken into account? Finally, specifically for the external sub-
sidy systems, how to fix $, i.e. what is the optimal balance between solidarity
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contributions and premium contributions? Despite the strong formal similarity
in their systems, the five countries considered have sometimes taken very dier-
ent positions on these issues. An overview of these dierent positions is given
in Table 1. We will discuss the implied ethical choices from section 4 onwards.
To provide a clearer view on these dierences, however, we first present in the
next section a simple conceptual framework. We will, for expository purposes,
work mainly within the context of the "external" modality of risk adjustment,
but all ideas and concepts can be easily translated to the internal modality and
where necessary we will do this explicitly.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
3 Risk adjustment and ethical trade-os: a con-
ceptual framework
Let us denote the health care consumption of individual l by the vector jln>
where l = 1>===>Q refers to the individuals and n = 1>===>N to the dierent health
care items. For reasons that will become clear later on, this vector is defined
broadly and may include items such as acupuncture or aesthetical surgery. If the
individual has taken health insurance, she will not have to pay the full amount
of these expenditures herself. This can be captured by introducing a distinction
between the prices received by suppliers (sVln>l = 1>===>Q>n = 1>===N ) and the
prices paid by the patients themselves (sGln>l = 1>===>Q>n = 1>===N ). It is then
possible to distinguish between three cases:
(a) items which are covered completely by the insurance system have sGln = 0.
The patient does not have to pay anything at the point of consumption.
(b) items which are not covered by the insurance system have sGln = sVln.
Patients have to pay the full price at the point of consumption.
(c) items which are included in the insurance system but for which patients
have to pay partly themselves (either because there is a formal co-payment or
there are supplements to be paid to the providers in some cases - e.g. one person
rooms) have 0 ?s Gln ?s Vln.
Note that we have added a subscript i to both supply and demand prices.
In the case of demand prices the index captures dierences in insurance status
between individuals. To give an obvious example: in many countries weaker
social groups have to pay lower co-payments. Supply prices may dier between
regions or in dierent types of health plans. To avoid a considerable complica-
tion of the notation, we do not explicitly introduce dierent providers into the
model but rather use the subscript l to indicate the "supply prices" relevant to
individual l (given the health plan she has chosen or the region where she is
living). With this notation it is straightforward to write the expenditures to be
covered by the insurer for individual i as:
Fl =
X
n
sVlnjln 
X
n
sGlnjln (3)
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where the first term at the RHS refers to total health care expenditures made
for individual i and the second term to the own payments made by individual
i at the point of consumption. Health care expenditures are uncertain and we
will therefore introduce the notation FHl to denote expected expenditures.
Equity and premium dierentiation On a private health insurance market
(and neglecting transaction costs), the actuarially fair premium to be paid by
individual l would be Sl = FHl and her total health care payments would then
amount to
SD\ l = Sl +
X
n
sGlnjln (4)
In most European societies (and in the five countries considered) the resulting
distribution of health care payments is deemed unacceptable from an equity
point of view. In this respect dierent issues can be discerned:
(a) Sl and SD\ l will not depend on the income position of the insured
(except when this income position has significant health eects). However, many
people feel that richer citizens should pay a larger contribution to the health
care system than poorer citizens: this is the so-called principle of (vertical)
equity in finance (Wagsta and van Doorslaer, 2000). How far one should go in
this respect is however a matter of debate.
(b) Sl will be larger for risk groups with larger expected health care expen-
ditures. If sGl 6= 0 the same is true for the second term at the RHS of (4). In
some cases this is not problematic. One of the main objectives of introducing
co-payments sGln is precisely to create financial incentives against moral hazard.
Hence, it is to be expected that the dierential incidence of overconsumption
and moral hazard will lead to socially acceptable and even desirable dierences
in SD\ l. Another example of acceptable dierences would be the situation in
which the larger expenditures relate to elements of the vector jl which are con-
sidered to be the individual’s own responsibility (e.g. some aesthetical surgery).
However, if the dierences in SD\ l reflect dierences in morbidity for which
individuals cannot be held responsible, this will usually be seen as inequitable.
A dramatic example would be the case in which Sl is so large for l that she
cannot aord to take insurance. More specifically we can formulate the "ideal
of equity" in the following way:
Condition 1 EQUITY. PAYl should not dier between individuals diering
only in characteristics for which they cannot be held responsible.
The formulation is deliberately kept rather general and vague in that we do
not specify explicitly at this stage what is meant by "characteristics for which
individuals cannot be held responsible". More specifically, we leave open to
what extent people are held "responsible" for their own income position, and
hence, the importance attached to vertical equity in finance. The main purpose
of this paper is precisely to explore the consequences of dierent choices made
in this regard. Moreover, it is clear that condition 1 sketches a "pure" situation
and that the equity ideal will have to be traded o against other considerations:
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as soon as sGl 6= 0 to combat moral hazard, ill people will have to pay more than
healthy people even ifthere isno moral hazard at all.Therefore, in practice, the
formulation in the condition may be weakened to "should not dier too much".
Yet, in one way or another the whole idea of"managingthe competition"starts
from a concern about equity. And, without going into a deep philosophical
debate, it isclear that thisequity condition isclosely related to the idea of
equality ofaccess.
Community rating and risk selection A direct approach to implementing
the equity condition, isto legally restrict the acceptable premium dierentia-
tion.Asdescribed before, in all five countriesconsidered community ratingis
imposed.Let usnow consider the situation ofa sicknessfund which raisesa
community rated premium SF.In a situation without riskadjustment thiswill
create incentivesfor riskselection and cream-skimming.Indeed, we can write
the "expected profit"made by the sicknessfund on individual i as
l = SF  FHl (5)
Ifl 6= m , the insurersget incentivesto treat the two individuals i and j
dierently.Even ifopen discrimination islegally forbidden, such riskselection
can take varioussubtle and hidden forms(van de Ven and Van Vliet, 1992).
Most ofthese will result in a welfare lossfor the individualswith negative l.If
dierencesin l reflect dierencesin moral hazard, thismay not be too much of
a problem.However, very often dierencesin l will follow from dierencesin
morbidity.More generally, ifl 6= m for two individualsi and j who dier only
in characteristicsfor which they cannot be held responsible the equity problem
which we tried to avoid by imposingpremium restrictions, returnsthrough the
backdoor in the form ofdierential treatment.Thisisexactly the reason why
risk adjusted premium subsidiesare introduced into the system.In a system
with premium subsidieswe can reformulate (5)as:
l = SF + $l  FHl (6)
An ideal system ofriskadjustment should then satisfy
Condition 2 NO (UNDESIRABLE) RISK SELECTION. l shouldnot
dierbetweenindividualsdieringonlyincharacteristicsforwhich theycannot
beheldresponsible.
Note that we used in thissecond condition the same vague description (of
characteristicsfor which individualscannot be held responsible)asin the equity
condition 1.Again, it will be shown in the next sectionshow the specific content
ofcondition 2varieswith the institutional context and how it isrelated to the
problem ofriskadjustment.
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Cost-eectiveness and acceptable costs Starting from (6) it is immedi-
ately obvious that one could satisfy condition 2 trivially by defining $l = Fl, i.e.
by letting the solidarity fund reimburse all expenditures of the sickness funds.
Since with this definition for $l, any increase in health care expenditures Fl
leaves the "expected profit" obtained for individual i unchanged, it destroys all
incentives for the sickness funds to control costs. In an ideal system of man-
aged competition, however, there should be monetary incentives for the sickness
funds to be cost-eective. Expressing incentives in terms of "profits", we can
make this cost-eectiveness condition explicit (again in an informal way):
Condition 3 COST-EFFECTIVENESS. l should increase if the sickness
fund succeeds in delivering to individual i health care of the same quality in a
more cost e!cient way.
This brings us directly to the core questions of risk adjustment and of the
definition of acceptable costs. Indeed, the most straightforward approach to
satisfy condition 3 is the introduction of a system of benchmarking. More
specifically, the premium subsidies in the risk adjustment system can be based
on "acceptable costs", i.e. "the costs generated in delivering a specified basic
benefits package containing only medically necessary and cost-eective care"
(van de Ven and Ellis, 2000, p. 767). In our notation this could be written as
$l = DFl 
X
n
(sVln  sGln )jln (7)
where we use the acronym AC for "acceptable costs". Equation (7) makes ex-
plicit that decisions have to be be taken with respect to "acceptable prices" (sVln
and sGln ) and with respect to "acceptable (intensity of) treatment" (jln). The
former decision relates to the content of the insurance cover, the level of accept-
able co-payments and the acceptable supply prices;the latter decision relates to
the definition of cost-eectiveness and to the desired level of quality. Implement-
ing (7) implies that the premium subsidies received are independent of actual
expenditures and rather are linked to a concept of normative expenditures4 .
Let us look more carefully at the economic consequences of this benchmark-
ing. Using (7) we can rewrite eq. (6) as
l = SF +DFl  FHl (8)
The minimal (community-rated) premium to be set by the sickness fund in order
to avoid negative profits can then be immediately written as
Smin = 1Q
X
(FHl DFl) (9)
4 In the simplest case of a retrospective risk adjustment system, DFl can be equal to the
average observed expenditures for the group to which i belongs, where the average is taken
over all the sickness funds. In fact, this is the standard procedure in countries with an internal
subsidy system. Using average costs still constitutes a form of benchmarking.
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where Q is its number of enrollees. If per capita costs are larger than per capita
acceptable costs, the sickness fund will have to increase its (community-rated)
premium. In a competitive market this premium increase will lead to a loss of
members. Since the acceptable costs are set by the solidarity fund, the sickness
fund can only avoid this premium increase if it succeeds in aligning its actual
costs to the acceptable costs. It can do so in three ways:
(a) it can increase its overall e!ciency. This is unambiguously desirable, if
the patients are su!ciently informed and the insurance market is su!ciently
competitive to minimize the danger of unacceptable quality decreases.
(b) it can focus its eorts of cost control on specific client groups. In fact, if
DFl  FHl ADF m  FHm this profit dierential signals to the sickness fund that
patient m is treated in a less e!cient way than individual l. If it is possible to
increase the cost-eectiveness of the treatment of specific groups, the sickness
fund has the incentives to do so. Although increasing the cost-eectiveness is
desirable in se, it may have an eect on the subjective satisfaction of patients
by decreasing the subjective quality of care or the freedom of choice.
(c) moreover, the same profit dierential also creates incentives for risk se-
lection, as described earlier.
The choice between (a), (b) and (c) will be co-determined by the relative
(monetary and reputation) costs for the insurers of controlling providers versus
selecting risks. To predict what will happen we need good theoretical and em-
pirical models of insurer behavior focusing on the choice between these various
options. These models should incorporate the characteristics of the markets for
insurers and providers5 . Since the social context and the specific institutional
details of the health insurance markets dier considerably between countries,
the reactions of insurers to similar monetary incentives may also be dierent.
To some extent, this may also explain the dierent policy choices.
All this immediately points to the di!cult trade-os involved in setting
the acceptable costs (7) in the risk adjustment system. The more restrictive
they are defined, the larger the incentives for dierential treatment of dierent
groups. If such dierential treatment aects groups or individuals "diering
only in characteristics for which they cannot be held responsible" we get a
conflict with condition 2. If acceptable costs are defined in a very broad way so
as to satisfy condition 2, we may get a conflict with condition 3. The choices
with respect to (7) will therefore necessarily reflect value judgments about the
relative importance of solidarity versus cost-eectiveness. The discussion in the
following sections will explore these dierent value judgments. W e will focus
on four specific policy questions, which have led to various choices in the five
countries considered:
(a) how far does one want to extend the equity condition 1, or: what is to
be included in the basic benefits package (section 4)?
5There has been surprisingly little empirical research on this topic in the context of insurer
behaviour. There has been somewhat more research on similar problems in the context of
hospital financing - see, e.g., Ellis and McGuire (1996).
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(b) what should be the relationship between actual composition and intensity
of treatment (jln>l = 1>===>Q>n = 1>===>N ) and "acceptable" (or cost-eective)
composition and intensity of treatment (jln>l = 1>===>Q>n = 1>===>N ) (section
5)?
(c) how to incorporate managed care eorts; how to treat voluntary de-
ductibles and dierences in supply and demand prices (section 6)?
(d) what are the consequences of varying the relative importance of $ and
of the direct premium contributions by the patients (section 7)?
4 What services are included in the basic bene-
fits package?
The first decision to be taken is about what items to include in the basic benefits
package. This is the traditional question of priority setting in health care. It is
well known that dierent countries have taken dierent decisions in this respect
(see van de Ven et al., 2003). Dental care, physiotherapy and psychiatric care are
typical examples: they are included in the benefits package by some countries
and excluded by others.
At first sight the implications for risk adjustment are straightforward. If
item k is excluded from coverage, it follows in the notation of the previous
section that sGln = sVln. As eqs. (3) and (6) immediately show, one can, for the
determination of the risk adjusted subsidies, simply neglect these items without
creating incentives for risk selection. This is trivial: since the insurers do not
have to reimburse any expenditures for items which are excluded from coverage
in the mandatory system, there is no reason at all to include them in the risk
adjustment formula. Still the decision about the content of the basic benefits
package is crucial from the point of view of the equity condition 1. Moreover,
specific questions arise as soon as the insurers get the freedom to vary to some
extent the content of the basic package.
4.1 The content ofthe basic benefits package
If an item such as dental care is excluded from the mandatory insurance cover
there are two possibilities. Either consumers (patients) have to pay the full cost
of dental care themselves. It is immediately obvious that own payments then
will be dierent for dierent consumers. Alternatively insurers may oer sup-
plementary insurance in a competitive market. In that market competition will
lead to premium dierentiation and those at higher risk will have to pay a larger
premium. In both cases there will be an equity problem (a problem of unequal
access), if dental care is not considered to be part of each individual’s own re-
sponsibility. Moreover, it is well known that oering supplementary insurance
may be a very e!cient tool for selecting risks (van de Ven and Van Vliet, 1992)
- certainly if the same insurers are active in both the mandatory and the sup-
plementary health insurance market as is the case in the countries considered.
Restricting the cover in the mandatory system by excluding some health-related
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items therefore may increase the potential danger of risk selection. The broader
the definition of the basic benefits package, the smaller the room for personal
responsibility and the larger the scope of solidarity.
There are more choices for the regulator, however. Consider the case of
health care expenditures which are clearly linked to a certain lifestyle. Take
skiing accidents as an example. If these are judged to be part of individual
responsibility, they could in principle be excluded from the basic benefits pack-
age in the mandatory system. This would imply that the financial burden is
borne completely by the patients. Although in most countries there has been
some debate about whether lifestyle induced expenditures (such as the costs of
cholesterol reducing tablets for smokers) should be removed from the coverage
of the mandatory system, this has appeared socially unacceptable. An alter-
native approach, however, would be to keep skiing accidents in the mandatory
cover but not to include them (or include them only partially) in the definition
of acceptable costs. We return to that possibility in section 5.
The basic benefits package can be specified in greater or lesser detail. In
Belgium, there is a detailed list of acceptable treatments (the so-called "nomen-
clature"). The same is true for ambulatory care in Germany and Israel, but in
the latter countries all customary and regular inpatient care is considered to be
acceptable. In Switzerland all non-physician treatments are regulated in detail,
for physician treatments it is su!cient to be eective and e!cient. The largest
degree of freedom is oered by the new system introduced in the Netherlands in
2006: the basic benefits package is defined in terms of functions of care. That
is, the law describes the nature, the content and the extent of care, while the in-
surance contracts state who delivers the care, where and under what conditions.
It is clear that these dierent approaches influence the speed with which new
therapies and pharmaceuticals are included in the mandatory cover. In Belgium
and Switzerland new treatments will usually pass through the supplementary
insurance system first, with all the equity consequences described before. In the
other countries, insurers also have a more direct influence on the adoption of
new techniques in the compulsory cover. In general, more flexibility increases
the room for the sickness funds to manage the care. This may improve e!ciency,
but at the same time raise the danger of quality-skimping and cream-skimming.
We will return to the resulting challenges for risk adjustment in section 6.
4.2 Variation in the basic benefits package
In most countries the basic benefits package is nearly identical for the dierent
insurers. In Belgium variation in the basic benefits package is excluded by law.
There is some room for variation in Israel and Germany. In Israel, sickness
funds may expand the package for their insurees but cannot deny services and
quantities listed in the mandatory package. In Germany insurers can choose to
include additional items, such as spa treatment or experimental new technolo-
gies. These benefits are then financed through the premium contributions.
The introduction of a substantial degree of variation has been considered
only in the Netherlands. In February 2003 the Health Council of the Nether-
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lands, following earlier similar advice by the Social Economic Council, advised
government to make a distinction between a “Mandatory Benefits Package”and
a “Solidarity-based Benefits Package”rather than having one “Basic Benefits
Package”. It was argued that the motives for government to make health in-
surance mandatory and the motives to organize mandatory cross-subsidies for
health insurance are dierent. Motives for making health insurance manda-
tory are related to external eects, merit good arguments and the prevention
of free-rider behavior. Applying these motives results in a “Mandatory Bene-
fits Package”. As criteria for defining the (broader) “Solidarity-based Benefits
Package”the Health Council advised use of individual disease burden combined
with the cost-eectiveness of the care. According to the Social Economic Coun-
cil, the benefits package of the low option plan could be about 75% of that
of the high option plan by excluding coverage for e.g. general practitioners,
physiotherapy, cheap prescription drugs, etc. The dierence between these two
benefits packages can be considered as a voluntary supplementary health insur-
ance (i.e. supplementary to the Mandatory Benefits Package), but with risk
adjusted premium subsidies. Of course, in addition to the “Solidarity-based
Benefits Package”there might still be all kinds of supplementary health insur-
ance without mandatory cross-subsidies.
This option was not implemented in the 2006 reform: in the actual situation
there is still one basic benefits package, but as described before, concrete entitle-
ments may vary. Moreover, the Health Insurance Law introduced the possibility
of voluntary deductibles. Voluntary deductibles also exist in Switzerland. From
the point of view of risk adjustment, the analysis of voluntary deductibles is
completely analogous to the analysis of variations in the benefits package. The
basic benefits package without a deductible can be seen as the Solidarity-based
Benefits Package; and the high deductible option as the Mandatory Benefits
Package. As voluntary deductibles are empirically more relevant than variation
in the basic benefits package, we will postpone the analysis of these issues to
section 6.
5 What individual characteristics are taken up
in the risk adjustment formula?
A second crucial decision to be taken when introducing a risk adjustment system
is the definition of what constitutes the "medically necessary and cost-eective"
amount of care (jln) in Eq. (7). In principle one could base this definition on
a detailed investigation of concrete therapies prescribed. Such a control mecha-
nism would probably entail large transaction costs and can hardly be optimal in
a situation of asymmetric information between the solidarity fund and the sick-
ness funds, between the sickness funds and the providers, between the providers
and the patients. Although we will come back to a concrete application of this
approach in Germany later, in practice the definition of acceptable costs in all
countries has been based mainly on an empirical analysis of actual expenditures.
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While in principle it could be advisable to estimate a system of equations
with a separate equation for each category of health care, in all countries mat-
ters have been simplified by focusing on total individual expenditures, and more
specifically total expenditures as covered by the insurers. Health care con-
sumption is determined through complex interaction of decisions by patients,
providers and insurers in various markets. Let us specify for later reference a
full (reduced form) explanatory model as
Fl = f(Pl># l>s Gl >\ l>* l>s Vl >% l) (10)
in which we include as important demand factors morbidity Pl, a vector of
taste and preference variables #l, the vector of demand prices sGl and income
\l, and as supply factors a vector of provider characteristics *l (remember our
use of the subscript i for supply variables) and the vector of supply prices sVl =In
addition there is a stochastic component %l.
Estimating a model like in Eq. (10) is not a trivial task.6 More importantly
for our purposes, estimating an explanatory model of actual expenditures does
not directly give us a formula for defining normative expenditures or acceptable
costs. If normative expenditures simply coincided with actual expenditures, the
whole exercise of risk adjustment would no longer be necessary. A crucial step
therefore is to partition the vector of explanatory variables in (10) into two
subvectors: one containing the variables for which individuals cannot be held
responsible and which should be included in the definition of acceptable costs
(call these C-variables), the other containing the variables for which individuals
and insurers are held responsible because they reflect dierences in subjective
tastes or dierences in e!ciency (call these R-variables)7 . This partition is not a
scientific problem; it will necessarily reflect ethical and political considerations.
Table 1 gives an overview of the risk adjusters that are presently taken into
account in the five countries for the calculation of the premium subsidies.
Before we turn to a more detailed discussion of these political choices, let
us first make a general methodological point about how to handle the parti-
tion in the estimation stage. The conventional approach (followed explicitly
in the Netherlands and Israel and implicitly in the cell-means method of Ger-
many and Switzerland) is to estimate a restricted version of (10) with only the
compensation-variables included and then to define the acceptable costs as the
costs predicted by that restricted equation. An alternative approach is to esti-
6The current practice in the countries with an external subsidy system is to start (with
varying degree of sophistication) from an econometric analysis of the explanatory model (10).
The countries with an internal subsidy system apply a system of cell means to determine the
amounts to be given to or received from the solidarity fund. Although this may seem very
dierent in practice, the dierences are more apparent than real. The cell-means approach
can be interpreted as a simple linear specification of (10) with a series of dummies, and the
choice of variables to be included in the econometric analysis is equivalent to the choice of
dimensions to be taken into account for defining the relevant cells.
7 In principle it is possible to include all observable explanatory variables as C-variables in
the definition of acceptable costs. This would imply that "benchmarking" takes place through
the unobservable stochastic element %l in (10). Compensation and responsibility variables are
sometimes called "legitimate" and "illegitimate" risk adjusters (Rice and Smith, 2001a).
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mate first a full explanatory model and then fix the values of the responsibility-
variables at some constant value for the determination of the acceptable costs.
The latter approach is used in Belgium (where medical supply is interpreted as
a responsibility variable) and defended on theoretical grounds in Schokkaert and
Van de Voorde (2004). In practice the dierence between the two approaches will
be relevant only if there is a su!ciently large correlation between the omitted
and the included variables, so that the omission leads to a significantly dierent
(and biased) estimation of the coe!cients of the included variables. For the
following arguments in this paper the dierences between both approaches can
be neglected.8
Region9 Table 1 shows that the five countries under consideration have taken
widely dierent decisions with respect to the choice of C-variables. Let us
illustrate the consequences of this choice by focusing on the treatment of in-
terregional dierences in health care expenditures. Suppose (realistically) that
region has a significant eect in (10) and consider two individuals k and l living
in dierent regions such that (ceteris paribus) FHn ?F Ho . If region is not taken
up in the definition of acceptable costs, we have (ceteris paribus) DFn = DFo.
In that case it immediately follows from (8) that
n  SF n A o  SF o
We can now distinguish between dierent situations:
(a) region is not taken up explicitly, but by a range of "deeper" variables.
"Region" can cover both subjective preference and provider variables. With
morbidity information missing, it can even capture morbidity dierences. Using
"region" as a catch-all variable therefore makes the explanation rather fuzzy. It
also complicates the definition of acceptable costs because "region" may proxy
a mixture of C- and R-variables. The introduction of more basic variables has
been the Belgian approach to the problem of "region": in the explanatory model
dierent regional variables are taken up (such as degree of urbanization, quality
of housing and medical supply). The two former variables are included in the
risk adjustment formula, supposedly as proxies for morbidity or socioeconomic
dierences; the latter variable is excluded, supposedly to give the insurers the
incentives to fight overconsumption due to supply inducement (Schokkaert and
Van de Voorde, 2003). A simpler approach is followed in the Netherlands, where
the distinction between C- an R-variables is not made, but "urbanization" is
introduced as an acceptable risk adjuster.
8 It has been argued that even in a situation with perfect information on all the relevant
variables, it may be impossible to reconcile the three conditions (equity, no risk selection,
cost-eectiveness) proposed in section 3. This happens if the marginal eect of an R-variable
depends on the values of C-variables and vice versa, or, more precisely, if the function f(=) in
(10)isnotadditivelyseparablein theC-andR-variables(seeSchokkaert,DhaeneandVan de
Voorde(1998)forthetheoreticalargumentandSchokkaertandVan deVoorde(2004)foran
illustration thattheeectmaybeempiricallyrelevant).Untilnow,thispointhasnotreceived
anyconsideration in thepracticeofriskadjustment.
9SeeRiceandSmith(2001b)foran analogousanalysisoftheethicalaspectsofgeographical
allocation ofhealthcareresources.
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(b) region as such is taken up in the definition of acceptable costs. If there
are interregional dierences in e!ciency, e.g. following from practice variations,
sickness funds will have no incentives to do anything about them. In 2006, no
country follows this simple approach.
(c) region is not taken up in the definition of acceptable costs but regional
premium dierentiation is allowed. This is the case in Switzerland. In that
case we can expect premium dierences to capture the dierences in regional
costs. The inhabitants of dierent regions have to bear the consequences of
the cost dierences. It is also to some extent the Dutch situation. Since 2006
premiums can be dierentiated according to province (there are 12 provinces
in total). However, regional cost dierences within a province (which are not
su!ciently compensated for by the use of urbanization as a risk adjuster) cannot
be absorbed by premium dierentiation. This brings us to the last possibility.
(d) region is not taken up in the definition of acceptable costs while regional
premium dierentiation remains forbidden. This is the Israeli and German
situation. It implies that there may be dierences in profitability between the
dierent regions. The consequences have been described in section 3. Either
sickness funds may invest in region-specific e!ciency improving measures, or
they may opt for risk selection. The latter option can be realized simply by
withdrawing from certain regions. The area of activity of the sickness funds
plays an important role in this regard. Regional funds will have di!culties
competing with nationwide funds in expensive regions;national funds will have
di!culties competing in cheap regions.
Note how options (c) and (d) fit into the framework sketched in section 3. If
the regulator decides not to include region in the definition of acceptable costs,
this means that she considers regional cost dierences not to be a reason for
compensation. The fact that dierent regions are treated dierently is therefore
not worrisome from an equity point of view (and a focused investment in cost-
e!ciency will be desirable).
Of course, an analogous reasoning holds for all other variables in (10). If a
relevant explanatory variable is left out from the definition of acceptable costs,
this will lead to a dierential treatment of dierent groups of individuals. This
dierential treatment may take dierent forms:it may imply premium dier-
entiation (if allowed), or focused eorts to improve e!ciency, or risk selection,
or a mixture of all these. Such dierential treatment is not problematic if the
regulator leaves out an observable variable deliberately, because it is considered
to be part of the individual responsibility of patients or insurers. The com-
plexity of the risk adjustment formula therefore will reflect dierent ideas about
where to draw the boundary between these individual responsibilities and social
responsibility. However, there may be di!cult ethical trade-os involved. Let
us illustrate these with respect to the morbidity variables.
Morbidity Almost everybody agrees that morbidity dierences are largely
beyond the responsibility of individuals. Much individualized morbidity infor-
mation is readily available to the sickness funds and can be used for undesirable
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risk selection. Yet even in the case where the regulator would dispose of that
same information, introducing it into the definition of acceptable costs is not
always optimal. Sometimes the relevant information can be manipulated by
the insurers (e.g. upcoding of DRG-information), or using it could have detri-
mental eects on the incentives for cost-eectiveness (e.g. past health care
expenditures). In this case, the trade-o between conditions 2 and 3 becomes
particularly acute. Decisions with respect to morbidity will therefore also re-
flect judgments about the relevancy of wrong incentives and will reflect the
dierential weights given to solidarity and cost containment.
Again, the dierent countries take dierent positions on this spectrum. The
situation is clear in the Netherlands and Belgium. Morbidity information (based
both on diagnostic groups and on pharmaceutical consumption) plays a crucial
role in the Dutch system of risk adjustment. In fact, since 2006 the bylaws of the
Dutch Health Insurance Act specify that the premium subsidies should only be
adjusted for age, gender and health status, and not for other risk factors such
as providers’(in)e!ciency, overcapacity and the price level of the contracted
providers. In Belgium, the information on DRG-groups and on pharmaceutical
consumption is now being collected and there is general consensus about the
desirability to include it in the future risk adjustment model. In the actual
model indicators of chronic illness and of disability categories have already been
included. Although there has been some discussion about the manipulability of
these data, this was not considered an argument to exclude them. In fact, many
observers keep arguing in favor of a risk adjustment formula which includes
as many variables as possible. Even “number of days in the hospital” keeps
cropping up as an “explanatory”variable (and is presented as an indicator of
morbidity).
The situation is less clear in Israel and Germany. The Israeli risk adjustment
system contains only age as a risk adjuster, but in addition there is risk sharing
with respect to five specific health conditions (dialysis, hemophilia, gauche, tha-
lasemia and aids). The need to include more and better health measures in the
formula is widely recognized, but nothing has been done so far, mainly because
of the di!culties to obtain adequate measures and because of the fear of per-
verse incentives. Germany planned to introduce health-based risk adjustment
from 2007 onwards and a research consortium, commissioned by the Ministry
of Health, presented some specific proposals in 2004 (W asem, Lauterbach and
Schräder, 2005). The apparent consensus around introducing morbidity in-
formation has crumbled, however, and at present it is far from clear whether
morbidity information will be used in the near future.
To some extent, the discussion in Switzerland resembles that in Germany.
As mentioned already, the Swiss legislator expected the high mobility of the
insured to wash away all profits from risk selection and to induce all insurers
to optimize e!ciency. This explains why Switzerland introduced a very crude
risk adjustment formula based only on age and gender in 1993. In 2004 the
national parliament has prolonged the use of this crude formula until 2010. In
reality, however, there is more and more evidence that risk selection increases.
Therefore the introduction of morbidity information soon returned to the top
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of the political agenda. Two formulas are in the political discussion. First there
is a simple model proposed by Beck (2004): he recommends introducing prior
hospitalization as additional factor. Indeed, if someone has been taken up in
hospital, costs in later years turn out to be significantly larger. A second propo-
sition is a more complex model of Holly et al. (2004) based on diagnoses from
hospital stays. Taking due account of the di!culties to predict the outcomes of
the political process, there is a good chance that the risk adjustment formula
will be reformed in the mid term according to Beck’s proposition and in the
long run according to the refined formula by Holly et al. If one follows the
reasoning in this paper, this is in fact the only logical solution. There is no
theoretical reason to think that competition will remove the incentives for risk
selection. If one can control the manipulation problem, morbidity is certainly
not under the control of patients or insurers and it definitely has an eect on
medical expenditures. Hence, it is advisable to include it in the risk adjustment
formula if possible.
Lifestyle and socio-economic dierences We have mentioned in the previ-
ous section that the exclusion from the basic benefits package of lifestyle related
health care expenditures has proven to be politically unacceptable in all of our
five countries. At the same time, however, lifestyle variables (such as skiing or
smoking) have not been included in the risk adjustment formula either. Unless
the eects of these variables are partly taken up by the included variables, insur-
ers will therefore not be compensated for the potentially higher expenditures.
In theory, they therefore have the incentive to try to minimize the number of
skiing accidents or to influence smoking behavior.
Since in Germany, Israel and Switzerland not even morbidity is generally
accepted as a risk adjuster, it is not surprising that socio-economic variables
are not included either10 . There has been some debate in Belgium and in the
Netherlands. Let us focus on the group of the self-employed, which in general
have lower costs than the employees. In Belgium the employed and the self-
employed are treated separately in the risk adjustment system, which implies
that all dierences are compensated for. This fits the general picture of a reg-
ulator that wants to compensate for almost all dierences in expenditures. In
the Netherlands the discussion has been more lively and focused on the ques-
tion: are these dierences in expenditures due to ‘health’ or to ‘behaviour’?
From 2004 onwards “being self-employed” has been included as a risk adjuster,
which means that sickness fund received a lower premium subsidy for the self-
employed than for employed people. As was mentioned already, in the new
insurance system from 2006 onwards, there is an exclusive focus on age, gender
and morbidity information. Nevertheless, being self-employed is still included as
a risk adjuster. In fact, one could argue that this should not be done, i.e. that if
health is taken into account su!ciently, for instance by age/sex/PCGs/DCGs,
10 In this statement we neglect the corrections in the German system for the dierences
in income-related contributions, because this is not really a correction for income-related
dierences in expenditures. See Buchner and Wasem (2003) for more details.
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then any systematic dierence in costs between employed and self-employed
people should not be compensated via the risk adjusted premium subsidies. If
there remain dierences between employed and self-employed after correcting
for health dierences, either this should be reflected in a lower premium con-
tribution for the self-employed, or (if the premium contribution is community
rated), the self-employed people will form a preferred risk group.
It must be clear that the dierent choices made by the dierent countries
reflect to a large extent the political background as sketched in section 2. In
Switzerland there seems to be a strong (and to some extent unjustified) be-
lief that the working of the market will solve the problem of risk selection.
Moreover, the cultural dierences between regions and linguistic groups are so
important that countrywide solidarity was neither feasible nor desirable. In the
Netherlands there is a belief in the working of market forces, but at the same
time a real concern for risk selection: hence the strong emphasis on introducing
morbidity information. At the other extreme, there is Belgium where the belief
in markets is minimal: hence a very broad risk adjustment formula. In between
are Israel and Germany. In these countries the discussion about introducing
morbidity information is not yet settled.
Let us finish this section with two general points. First, it is striking that
the option of allowing premium dierentiation for R-variables is not the course
which is followed in most countries - region being an exception to the rule that
community rating is imposed by law. This is surprising from a theoretical point
of view, as it can be argued that premium dierentiation is the natural next step
if the solidarity fund deliberately leaves out some variables on equity grounds. If
skiing accidents remain in the mandatory cover but are left out for the definition
of acceptable costs, it is natural to allow the sickness funds to dierentiate
premiums between skiers and non-skiers. In other cases -where information is
not available or can be manipulated- it may seem a priori less natural to allow for
premium dierentiation. But what if the prohibition of premium dierentiation
leads to risk selection and perhaps even the dumping of patients? Could it
not be argued that in most cases premium dierentiation is less harmful from
an equity point of view than risk selection? Premium dierentiation certainly
will create a more transparent market situation. Moreover, if one gives more
freedom to the sickness funds for dierentiating premiums, the resulting market
outcomes may be helpful in signalling what are the crucial variables missing in
the risk adjustment formula. This information may be helpful in a dynamic
perspective, i.e. for updating the risk adjustment-formula.
Second, a special situation arises if the medical expenditures of some social
groups are deemed too low from an equity perspective. Arab groups in Israel
are a well-documented example (Shmueli, 2000). If these groups have lower
than average expenditures (ceterisparibus) this would show up as a negative
coe!cient in the explanatory model. In this case, simply neglecting that eect
in the risk adjustment formula may be advisable because it makes these groups
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preferred risks - a situation similar to the one of the self-employed described be-
fore. However, if they have larger than average expenditures but the regulator
feels that the dierence is "not large enough"to compensate for the dierence in
needs, this simple solution will not work. The estimated group eect certainly
will have to be included in the risk adjustment formula -otherwise there would
be incentives for risk selection. One might even consider the use in the formula
of a larger coe!cient than the estimated one. With imperfect information, this
correction could be very ad hoc, however. If one is concerned about under-
consumption by specific social groups, direct subsidies or educational programs
are more suitable policy tools. It is striking that the problem has hardly been
considered in the debate on risk adjustment in any of the countries considered
here.
6 Solidarity and managed care
The treatment of price dierences deserves a more careful investigation. First,
contrary to the variables considered in the previous section, they enter the
relevant expressions (6) and (7) twice: they have not only a direct eect on
expenditures (at constant quantities) but also influence the quantity choice.
Secondly, they are closely linked to the use of managed care instruments by the
insurers. We first look at demand prices and then at supply prices. In both
cases it will be crucial to distinguish situations in which the sickness funds can
influence the prices from situations in which these prices are imposed on them.
The former case will lead us straight into a discussion of managed care.
6.1 Demand prices
One of the instruments to control moral hazard is to increase the own payments
of the patients. Both in Belgium and in Germany co-payments play an im-
portant role. In Switzerland and (recently) in the Netherlands use is made of
voluntary deductibles11 .
6.1.1 Co-payments and demand prices
Co-payments can be interpreted as a generalization of restrictions on the content
of the basic benefits package, as described in section 4. Both depart from full
insurance (where sGln = 0) because they have sGln A 0. Excluding items from
the basic benefits package implies 0 ?s Gln = sVln whereas co-payments can be
modelled as 0 ?s Gln ?s Vln. The resulting equity problems are similar: consumers
with larger health care needs will have to pay more, even if their larger needs
follow from factors for which they cannot be held responsible. In this case
the trade-o for the regulator is with the desire to fight moral hazard on the
consumer side (captured by the demand price eect in (10)).
11We do not discuss in this paper the German system of voluntary deductibles for the
voluntarily insured.
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The consequences for risk adjustment are obvious in the case where the
co-payments are introduced uniformly for all individuals. Only the part of
expenditures which has to be paid by the sickness funds should then enter the
risk adjustment formula. The problem is more complicated in the more realistic
situation where there is some dierentiation of co-payments.
Co-payments are dierentiated over individuals but are uniformly
imposed by the regulator on all the sickness funds. Let us first briefly
describe the situation in Belgium and Germany. In Belgium co-payments and
co-insurance rates are relatively large, covering about 15% of total health care
expenditures. Sickness funds are legally obliged to oer the same policies to all
members, but the reimbursement percentage diers by type of care and status
of the insured. Low income people (pensioners, widows/widowers, orphans, dis-
abled, older long term-unemployed) have a preferential treatment in that they
pay lower co-payments. Therefore reimbursements for those groups are auto-
matically larger for the same level of health care consumption. In addition,
there exists a system of social exemptions through which sickness funds reim-
burse fully the patient’s own contributions above a given (income-dependent)
threshold. The German system is similar. Co-payments are prescribed by
the law and they dier between various types of health care. There is also an
exemption rule: after having spent 2 % of their income for co-payments, peo-
ple are exempted for the rest of the year. For insured who are chronically ill,
the threshold is 1 % of their income. If somebody is exempted from paying
co-payments, the sickness fund is financing the dierence.
In Germany there has been a hot discussion about whether “being exempted
from co-payments” should be introduced as a risk adjuster, especially because
it was shown that even abstracting from the additional co-payments, the ex-
empted have health care costs far above average. This introduction was op-
posed, however, by those sickness funds who are “net payers” into the internal
risk adjustment mechanism and finally it was not implemented. Belgium took
the opposite decision, without much discussion. Preferential treatment and sev-
eral categories of people eligible for social exemption are included directly in
the risk adjustment formula. Moreover, special arrangements have been worked
out to fully compensate the sickness funds for the larger reimbursements in the
social exemption scheme.
Remember that dierences in co-payments have two eects: 1. a direct me-
chanical eect through the price dierences; 2. an indirect eect through the
quantity changes as the result of price changes. Ceteris paribus the latter ef-
fect may be interpreted as reflecting moral hazard. From a theoretical point
of view, we could get a better perspective on the trade-o between "fighting
moral hazard" and "avoidance of risk selection" if we succeeded in distinguish-
ing empirically these two eects. In a situation where this crucial empirical
information is lacking, dierent decisions taking by dierent countries reflect
dierent ethical choices. Since Germany does not correct for dierential co-
payments at all, there are incentives for risk selection against the low-income
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people. At the same time, the sickness funds have an incentive to fight the
specific moral hazard problem related to these groups. On the other hand, the
Belgian approach removes the incentives both for risk selection and for a tighter
control of moral hazard. In fact, it is regularly mentioned in the debate that the
increase in consumption as a result of lower co-payments does not reflect unde-
sirable moral hazard, but is a correction for previous under-consumption. More
importantly, the Belgian decisions also reflect the fact that hardly anybody sees
the individual sickness funds as playing an active role in cost control.
Insurers themselves oer dierent policies with a varying level of co-
payments. In Belgium, the sickness funds cannot themselves decide about
changes in co-payments. In Germany, since 2004 sickness funds may introduce
bonus programs, involving lower co-payments for participation in preventive
activities, registering in GP centered care, integrated care and disease manage-
ment programs. The opportunity is used widely. The bonus is financed as are
all other health expenditures of the funds. Therefore, reduced expenditures as
a consequence of the voluntary co-payments reduce the acceptable costs. This
situation in which patients themselves choose between dierent options has sim-
ilar consequences as the introduction of voluntary deductibles. Let us therefore
now turn to that issue.
6.2 Voluntary deductibles
In Switzerland voluntary deductibles were introduced already in 1990 and they
were revised several times since then. For the year 2005 consumers could choose
for a deductible of 500 CHF, 1000 CHF, 1500 CHF, 2000 CHF or 2500 CHF,
while a minimal deductible of CHF 300 was mandatory for all. These forms of
contracts have gained market share at high speed and today 45.9% of all insured
have opted for a high voluntary deductible option, while 16.9% have chosen the
two top classes. People opting for this kind of contract can save premiums up
to a maximum of 50%. In the Netherlands each person above the age of 18 has
since 2006 the option to voluntarily choose a deductible of at most 500 euro per
person per year.
To understand the consequences for risk adjustment let us consider dierent
cases. Consider first the hypothetical situation in which all patients would be-
long to the same risk group. They may have dierences in tastes, however, in
that some patients are more risk averse than others. The less risk averse patients
will choose the lower coverage if this leads to a su!ciently lower premium con-
tribution. The premium rebate on the high deductible contract will reflect the
insurer’s cost reduction, consisting of three components: 1. reduced expenses
because the insured herself pays up to the deductible amount; 2. reduced ex-
penses due to a reduction of moral hazard; 3. possibly lower administrative
costs. In this (hypothetical) situation of identical morbidity risk, there is no
reason why the regulator would not accept such premium rebates. The con-
sequences for risk adjustment are therefore obvious: even from the perspective
of condition 2 there is no reason to dierentiate the premium subsidies on the
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basis of dierences in benefits package.This raises the question of the level of
acceptable costs: do we base the uniform premium subsidy on the lower ob-
served costs of the restricted benefits package or on the higher observed costs of
the broader package or on some average of the two12? In this case the answer
to that question is less important than it may seem: it has only implications for
the relative importance of premium contributions and solidarity contributions in
the overall financing of the risk adjustment-system. We will return to that issue
in section 7. Note the equity implications of introducing voluntary deductibles.
Individuals who opted for a large deductible may end up with larger health
care expenditures ex post. However, these ex post dierences in own payments
follow from an ex ante free choice of insurance policy. From the equity point of
view there is no problem if society holds people personally responsible for their
subjective degree of risk aversion.
While the hypothesis of all patients belonging to the same risk group is no-
toriously unrealistic, it also nicely illustrates the case of perfect risk adjustment.
If there are dierences in risk, but they are observed by the regulator and are
taken care of in the determination of the risk adjusted premium subsidies, the
previous reasoning about the social acceptability of premium rebates still holds.
Things change, however, if risk adjustment is imperfect because dierences
in risk are not fully observable by the regulator. In that case the option of vol-
untary deductibles gives opportunities for self-selection by patients (and hence
of indirect risk selection by insurers). The better risks will be more inclined
to opt for the more restricted -and therefore cheaper- benefits package. The
resulting premium rebates will therefore partly reflect dierences in expected
expenditures which are due to "characteristics for which persons can not be
held responsible" - and there is a conflict with the equity condition 1. Of course
this eect gets mixed with the dierences in subjective risk aversion -for which
persons can be held responsible. The regulator then again faces a di!cult trade-
o:
(a) the regulator can accept the premium rebates on the market.This implies
that she considers the advantages of flexibility in terms of consumer choice and
e!ciency large enough to accept the resulting equity problems. The conclusion
that the premium subsidies should not be dierentiated according to the choice
of basic benefits package then remains. However, there seems to be a good case
for defining acceptable costs as the costs of the people who opted for no (or the
lowest possible) deductible, and hence as the health care consumption of the
higher risks, because this choice implies a larger share of the (risk-independent)
solidarity contributions in the overall financing of the system.
(b) the regulator can judge that the resultingdierences in premium con-
tributions on the market are too large and too strongly linked to dierences in
risks. A pragmatic solution then may be that the regulator allows dierentiation
of the premium contributions only within certain rate bands per observable risk
group. Of course, if the "maximal" premium dierentiation admitted by the
12 Implicitly, the latter option will be chosen in the cell-means approach of an internal
system.
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regulator is too small, nobody will opt for the large deductibles. Moreover, if
the freedom of premium dierentiation is restricted, i.e. if dierences in the
premium contributions do not fully compensate for dierences in expected ex-
penditures, there will be incentives for cream-skimming in favour of the better
risks who opt for the restricted coverage, unless there is some compensation
through dierentiation in the premium subsidies.
Such dierentiation in the premium subsidies will in general imply that some
of the additional expenses due to moral hazard are treated as acceptable to be
subsidized. This is unavoidable, however, if the regulator wants to reduce the
predictable losses on the high-risk consumers and thereby reduce the insurers’
incentive for risk selection. Moreover, most likely the increase in premium sub-
sidies will be higher for the elderly and unhealthy persons than for the young
and healthy people. This makes the elderly and unhealthy people the preferred
clients for e!cient insurers, and stimulates these insurers to be responsive to
the preferences of the high-risk users.13
It is instructive to see the treatment of voluntary deductibles in the risk
adjustment system of the Netherlands and Switzerland (van Kleef et al., 2006).
The Dutch government imposed that the premium rebates should be commu-
nity rated. Consequently it may be expected that because of adverse selection
insurers will give only very low premium rebates, based on their expected ex-
penditure reduction for the lowest risk group. The result may therefore be that
hardly anybody will choose the voluntary deductible. In Switzerland with its
internal risk adjustment system the lower expenditures as a result of the vol-
untary deductibles are not treated in a specific way in the computation of the
cell averages. This means that the possible e!ciency gains get seriously diluted.
Indeed, insurers who do not realize such e!ciency gains, will receive a larger
transfer from the more e!cient insurers.
6.3 Supply prices and managed care
Supply prices also have both a mechanical and a behavioral eect on expendi-
tures. Their eects are largely symmetrical to those of demand prices - although
the equity problems with respect to the patients are less acute. If dierences
in supply prices are not under the control of the sickness funds, it is obvious
that they should be controlled for in the risk adjustment formula. Otherwise
competition between dierent sickness funds would be biased, resulting in unde-
sirable dierences in l. There are, however, important questions with respect
13This argument is related to the one put forward by Glazer and McGuire (2000). They show
that if an insurance market contains any element of “separation” of risks in equilibrium, risk
adjustment can be improved over statistical average risk adjustment by putting more weight
(paying more) for adjusters associated with high costs. In their example, age, an imperfect
signal of true severity, is available for risk adjustment. Conventional risk adjustment on age
overpays for the healthy and underpays for the sick. The insurer attracting the sick will be
providing too few services in equilibrium. The regulator can do something about this because
the sick persons’ insurer has more old people. By paying more for the elderly, the regulator
can increase the spending on the sick.
25
to the proviso. How realistic is the assumption that supply prices cannot be
controlled by the insurers? The issue is relevant in Germany, where there are
significant regional dierences in supply prices in ambulatory care, and more
specifically in the capitations paid to the panel doctors’ associations. The gov-
ernment holds the position that the insurers can be held responsible for the price
dierences and therefore dierences in supply prices are not accounted for in
the risk adjustment formula. A similar decision is taken in Belgium. Dierences
in medical supply (physician density) have a significant eect on expenditures.
However, since they are interpreted by the regulator as being under the control
of the sickness funds, they are treated as an R-variable for the calculation of
the premium subsidies.
There can be no doubt that price dierences are under the control of the
insurers if they result from dierences in managed care. A typical example
would be the case in which prices result from negotiations between insurers and
providers. From a theoretical point of view, it immediately follows from our
cost-eectiveness condition 3 that such price dierentiation should not be taken
up in the risk adjustment formula. If sickness funds manage to decrease FHl (see
(6)), they should get the opportunity to decrease their premium contributions.
There remains the problem of the choice of the level of acceptable costs.
Should these be set at the level of the maximum price, the lowest price or
a price somewhere in between? Ideally, the acceptable costs should be the
costs generated in delivering the specified basic benefits package containing only
medically necessary and cost-eective care. In practice the calculation of these
costs will most often be impossible. A pragmatic solution would then be to
base the acceptable costs on the actual observed costs, i.e. a weighted average
of managed and unmanaged care. Consequently the risk adjusted premium
subsidies will be "too high". Is this a problem? Varying the level of the premium
subsidies (while keeping them identical for the dierent insurers) will not dilute
the incentives for e!ciency. Moreover, it may have an impact on the position
of dierent risk groups. Let us assume that the excess costs of unmanaged care
are a fixed percentage of the costs of managed care for each consumer, e.g.
+x%. The elderly and unhealthy persons will then receive a subsidy surplus,
which in absolute euros is a manifold of the subsidy surplus that the young and
healthy people receive. As argued before, this makes the elderly and unhealthy
preferred risks. Finally, the choice of the level of acceptable costs will have a
crucial influence on the relative importance of solidarity contributions VF and
premium contributions SF in the overall budget constraint of the health care
system (1). This issue will be considered in the next section.
To what extent are these basic principles applied in the countries under con-
sideration? In Belgium - not surprisingly - there is no room for managed care
in the compulsory system. In Germany also, the possibilities are very limited.
Since 2003, the insured can voluntarily register in an accredited disease manage-
ment program (DMP) oered by their sickness fund (Gress et al., 2006). The
government has so far defined four possible chronic conditions for DMPs: di-
abetes mellitus, breast cancer, asthma/chronic obstructive pulmonary disease,
and congestive heart failure. Guidelines of treatment for these conditions are
26
also determined by government on the basis of joint proposals by the medical
professions’ and sickness funds’ self-governing corporations. Every DMP set up
by a single sickness fund has to meet these guidelines and pass the Federal In-
surance O!ce to be accredited. The decision was taken to include (voluntary)
registration in an accredited disease management programme (DMP) as an ad-
ditional risk adjuster. This means that all insured people registered with an
accredited DMP are assigned to separate risk groups (cells) in the risk adjust-
ment matrix of the internal mechanism. This approach leads to a redistribution
of revenues from sickness funds with below-average rates of registered insured
to funds with above-average rates. Sickness funds that oer a DMP thus receive
appropriate compensation for every chronically ill person who registers. How-
ever, this solution is far from perfect: sickness funds now have strong incentives
to motivate as many insured people as possible to register in a particular DMP
irrespective of the outcomes of such a programme in terms of quality of health
care delivery and individual utility. The sickness funds’ incentives to produce
the units of service e!ciently thus remain unchanged or may even be reduced.
In Switzerland the insurers have more possibilities to manage the care. We
mentioned already the existence of voluntary deductibles. Another type of cost-
saving option is the gatekeeper model. Here the insured loses free access to all
physicians in a given region, but is rewarded by a premium rebate of between
10% or 25%. The insured can choose his gatekeeper from a given list of preferred
primary care physicians and is thereafter obliged to ask his gatekeeper whenever
he wants to be treated by a specialist or in a hospital. However, as in the case of
voluntary deductibles, the lower expenditures as a result of gatekeeping are not
treated in a special way in the calculation of the cell averages. This implies that
cost savings become (fully or partially) a public good and that the incentives for
e!ciency are diluted. Again, insurers who do not realize such e!ciency gains,
will receive a larger transfer from the more e!cient insurers.
Israel has already a long tradition of managed care. Recently, the discussion
about "acceptable input prices" has become more intense, in particular with
reference to the dierences in size and in care management among the sickness
funds. The largest sickness fund in Israel (the GSF with about 55% market
share in 2002) owns about 30% of the general beds, and operates clinics with
mainly salaried physicians. The other three smaller sickness funds do not own
general beds, and operate with contracted independent physicians. As a result,
dierences in average costs of care may result from economies/diseconomies
of scale and of scope, from dierent types of contracts with other providers,
from dierences in management style and competence, and from dierent lev-
els of other operating costs such as advertisement or financing costs. None of
these dierences are taking into account in the calculation of acceptable costs.14
Moreover, as mentioned before, the Israeli sickness funds are not allowed to raise
a premium contribution. Therefore, the question of what should be the “ref-
erence” levels considering “acceptable heterogeneities” across sickness funds is
14The only regulations related to “acceptable costs” exercised in the past have included
a ceiling on advertising expenditures, and “recovery programs” for sickness funds with large
deficits.
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expected to be crucial in future discussions.
Since 2000, the possibilities of managed care have also increased consider-
ably in the Netherlands. For example, since 2002 sickness funds are allowed
to set up new pharmacies and from 2003 they are allowed to set up outpatient
primary care centres. Some large sickness funds are experimenting with forms of
bonuses and risk sharing with the general practitioners. Since 2005 price-setting
for physiotherapy is free. Since 2005 hospitals are being paid on the basis of
so-called Diagnostic-Treatment-Combinations (DTCs). For 10% of these DTCs
sickness funds and hospitals are allowed to negotiate prices freely and to selec-
tively contract. Contingent on the results this percentage may further increase.
The new Health Insurance Act of 2006 provides insurers with several new tools
for managing care. As mentioned in section 4.1, the basic benefits package is de-
scribed in terms of functions of care. This implies that insurers and consumers
have ample room for dierentiating the concrete entitlements in the insurance
conditions. Furthermore, consumers can choose between entitlements in kind,
or reimbursement, or a combination. Preferred provider insurance arrangements
are also possible. Insurers in principle are allowed to selectively contract with
all types of health care providers, including hospitals. In such a setting the
question of what are the acceptable costs becomes of course crucial. In 2006 the
Netherlands has opted for the pragmatic solution, described earlier, in which
the acceptable costs are based on the actual observed costs. It has been argued
before that this is reasonable, the more so in a situation with very rich morbidity
information (and only morbidity information) in the risk adjustment formula.
Incentives for e!ciency are then kept, while the incentives for risk selection are
minimized.
7 Equity in finance and the overall budget
The determination of the overall (macro)budget $ is most relevant in countries
with an external subsidy system. We will first focus on these and later return
to the internal subsidy system. In general terms, the overall sum of premium
subsidies $ can be interpreted as the "acceptable level of aggregate health care
costs to be paid for by the solidarity fund from general means". The regular
increases in overall health expenditures over time make it necessary to update
regularly the macrobudget $. All the explanatory variables mentioned in the
previous sections and varying over time should be taken into account, the most
traditional ones being changes in the age and sex-groups (the ageing of the pop-
ulation), changes in the morbidity pattern (if these can be predicted), changes in
the prices of health inputs and changes in medical technology (including phar-
maceuticals). If the macrobudget is not su!ciently adjusted, the increasing
expenditures will be absorbed by the premium contributions in the Netherlands
and Belgium. In Israel, where the premium contribution is equal to zero, the
sickness funds themselves will have to bear the consequences of an insu!cient
increase in $. Moreover, as we argued before, if one is concerned about equity
in a situation with variations in the basic benefits package or the supply by
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the sickness funds of dierent policies (with varying levels of co-payments or
varying deductibles), it seems advisable to base the macrobudget on the broad-
est benefits package or the least restricted insurance policy, i.e. the "largest"
expenditures.
The determination of the global budget is particularly important for the
Israeli sickness funds. Since it is imposed that SF = 0 for all sickness funds,
eq. (6) immediately shows that they find themselves in a very awkward posi-
tion. If the global budget (and hence the premium subsidies) are too low to
cover expenditures, sickness funds will necessarily make losses. The regular ad-
justment of $ becomes a crucial issue for their long-term viability. It is not
surprising therefore that since the enactment of the National Health Insurance
Law in 1995, the Israeli debate has been focused more on the level of that global
budget (the so-called "cost of the basket") and less on the details of the risk
adjustment mechanism. The health budget is the result of political negotiations
and is decided by the government as part of the decision on its global budget
(expenditure). The Ministry of Finance has gained tremendous power in these
negotiations and has persistently opposed any “automatic” or structural updat-
ing on the basis of the variables described above. As a consequence, the real
value of the “acceptable" package of benefits has been eroded gradually over
the years. In order to keep the cost of the basket per age-adjusted standard
insuree at its level of 1995, it should have been increased by about 10% annu-
ally. In reality, it increased by only 4.3%. Part of that erosion was prevented
by the creation of deficits at a mean level of 3.7%. The net erosion has been
about 2% annually, or about 16% since 1995. The implications for equity and
risk selection are straightforward. The failure to maintain a “real” level of the
health budget put the sickness funds under financial pressure. Such pressure is
likely to promote e!ciency and cost-containment, but at the same time it might
induce the sickness funds to practice implicit risk selection and to reduce the
quality of care of selected services in order to improve financial solvency.
Both the Netherlands and Belgium have a more orthodox system in which
premium contributions can compensate for the dierences between premium
subsidies and expenditures. The determination of the macrobudget $ remains
important, however, as can be seen from the budget constraint (1). If $ goes
down, the part of solidarity contributions in the overall financing mix decreases
while the part of premium contributions increases. If solidarity contributions are
income-related and premium contributions are community-rated, this makes the
financing structure less progressive. The level of $ is therefore closely linked to
the ideal of equity in finance. On the other hand, if the premium contributions
are very low, the financial incentives for consumers on the health insurance
market become negligible and the induced reduction in mobility weakens the
e!ciency incentives for the insurers.
Again the choices made in both countries reflect dierent perspectives on the
organization of the health insurance system. In the Netherlands the ‘income re-
lated contribution’ as a percentage of the total expenditures was reduced from
90% (2000) to 78% (2003). Since 2006 the sum of the income-related contri-
butions equals only 50% of the total insurers’ revenues. Consequently the con-
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sumer’s out-of-pocket premium per person of 18+ per year increased from C=188
in 2000 to about C=350 in 2003 and about C=1000 in 2006. In Belgium income-
related contributions cover almost the whole of health care expenditures. Each
year a global budget is fixed in a complicated process of negotiations, involving
the sickness funds, the providers, the government and the social organizations.
If actual expenditures are larger than the budget, the deficit has to be covered
by the sickness funds. However, in the past the premium contribution has re-
mained very low and never exceeded C=15. The really important issue in the
health policy debate is the size of the global budget and not the incentives for
the insurers.
There is an additional aspect to this issue. If, as in Belgium, the level of $
is determined in a complex process of negotiations involving the sickness funds
and the organizations of providers, sickness funds and providers are objective
allies in lobbying for a larger macrobudget. In the light of what has been said
before this situation can have perverse consequences since an overly generous
macrobudget may dilute the incentives for cost-eectiveness in a situation with
relatively low premium contributions and a restricted degree of price competition
in the insurance market.
Let us finally return to the internal subsidy system of Germany and Switzer-
land. In that system premium subsidies to and from the dierent sickness funds
sum to zero, or $ =
P
l $l = 0. This implies that all changes in the overall
level of health care expenditures of the sickness funds will have to be covered by
changes in the premium contributions. Although the adjustment of the macro-
budget then is really a non-issue, the choice of an implicit subsidy system still
has consequences for some of the points mentioned earlier. In a situation with
varying benefits or insurance policies the equity problem resulting from premium
dierentiation will be more acute than in the external subsidy system. Not only
are there no solidarity contributions and is the level of premium contributions
therefore much higher. In addition, if the acceptable costs are computed with a
cell-means technique they will reflect an average value of demand prices, rather
than the lowest demand prices as advocated before.
As mentioned before, the fact that premium contributions are income related
in Germany raises some specific issues. These premium contributions have to
cover all expenditures by the sickness funds. While the risk adjustment scheme
equalizes financial power for the expenditures falling under the acceptable costs
(Buchner and Wasem, 2003), it does not equalize financial power for those ex-
penditures (like, e.g. spa treatments, or administrative costs) which are not
included in the definition of acceptable costs. With regard to the latter, sick-
ness funds with larger financial power can oer the same benefits with a lower
contribution rate. Therefore, incentives for risk selection with regard to income
remain.
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8 Conclusion
Both the academic literature and the political debate on risk adjustment in
health insurance tend to focus on statistical and technical aspects, as if risk
adjustment is devoid of any ethical content. This one-sided approach neglects
the crucial idea that risk adjustment in systems of managed competition has
as its main objective the removal of incentives for undesirable risk selection.
This latter objective relates to the ideals of equality of access and/or equality
of treatment. The specific decisions taken in the context of risk adjustment
will therefore necessarily reflect value judgments concerning the exact content
of these ethical ideals. These value judgments essentially boil down to fixing the
boundary between compensation on the one hand and individual responsibility
on the other. They imply a di!cult ethical trade-o between equity, avoidance
of undesirable risk selection and cost-eectiveness.
Divergences in social values of decision-makers and of the population partly
explain why dierent decisions have been taken with respect to the definition
of the basic benefits package, the choice of risk adjusters, the possibilities of
managed care and how it is integrated in the risk adjustment system, the relative
importance of income-related financing sources in the overall system. The actual
systems reflect dierences in the historical emphasis on solidarity (with Belgium
and the Netherlands at one extreme, Switzerland at the other), dierences in the
acceptance of managed care ideas (with Israel, Switzerland and the Netherlands
at one extreme, Belgium at the other) and dierent beliefs in the e!ciency of the
market mechanisms (with strong believers in Switzerland and the Netherlands
and an almost unanimous rejection in Belgium). It is important to focus the
political debate in the various countries on these basic ethical issues.
From a more theoretical point of view, this paper suggests at least two
important avenues for future research. In the first place, from a positive point of
view, it would be interesting to get a better understanding of the specific features
of the institutional and historical background which have led otherwise very
similar countries to such widely dierent choices. A political economy approach,
focusing on the relative power position of dierent pressure groups within the
health care system and on the specific features of the political decision making
process, might be particularly useful. In the second place, from a normative
point of view, it is important to go beyond the "statistical" approach to risk
adjustment and to integrate more explicitly some basic ideas from the welfare
economics and the social choice literature.15 Risk adjustment is not merely
a technical issue, it involves crucial trade-os between (dierent concepts of)
equity and e!ciency.
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TABLE 1. FEATURES OF RISK ADJUSTMENT SYSTEM (2006) 
BELGIUM GERMANY ISRAEL THE NETHERLANDS SW ITZERLAND 
SYSTEM EXTERNAL INTERNAL  EXTERNAL EXTERNAL INTERNAL 
total premium 
subsidies/(total premium 
subsidies+premium 
contributions) 
0.99 100 0.50 
BASIC BENEFITS 
PACKAGE
specified in detail specified for 
ambulatory care, 
more open for 
inpatient care 
specified for 
ambulatory care, 
more open for 
inpatient care 
open, defined in terms of 
functions of care 
specified in detail 
INDIVIDUAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
INCLUDED 
     
demographic variables age/gender age/gender age only age/gender age/gender 
morbidity As far as possible, 
general consensus 
about desirability 
NO, debate ongoing  NO, debate ongoing YES NO, debate ongoing 
life-style NO NO NO NO NO 
socioeconomic variables 
(e.g. self-employed) 
YES NO NO YES NO 
region Through other 
variables 
NO NO Yes (urbanization) NO 
regional premium 
differentiation allowed? 
NO NO NO YES  – per province YES 
COPAYMENTS? YES YES YES NO NO 
Different for different 
groups? 
YES YES YES
Treatment in RA Insurers fully 
compensated 
Not included in the 
risk adjustment 
system 
Not included in the 
risk adjustment 
system 
Influenced by insurers? NO Limited YES
Treatment in RA No special treatment: 
efficiency effects 
diluted 
   
VOLUNTARY 
DEDUCTIBLES? 
NO NO NO YES YES
Premium rebates? 
    
YES, but premium rebate 
community rated 
YES, but with a 
maximum 
Treatment in RA 
    
Acceptable costs equal to 
average costs in option 
without deductible 
No special treatment: 
efficiency effects 
diluted 
(EXOGENOUS) 
DIFFERENCES IN 
SUPPLY PRICES? 
NO YES YES YES (for hospitals; since 
2005 free prices for 
physiotherapy; maximum 
prices for physicians) 
NO 
Treatment in RA No special treatment No special treatment No special treatment 
OPPORTUNITIES 
FOR MANAGED 
CARE? 
NO LIMITED (DMP’s) LARGE LARGE LARGE 
Treatment in RA Special cells for 
members registerd in 
a DMP 
Neglected Average costs as acceptable 
costs 
No special treatment: 
efficiency effects 
diluted 
